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Welsh Office exceptionalism, economic development and devolution, 1979 to 1997. 
 
Between 1979 and 1997, five successive Conservative Secretaries of State headed the Welsh 
Office, the government department responsible for administratively devolved activity. The 
extent to which these ministers developed their own ‘exceptional’ policies at variance with 
those of central government was much debated, most commonly in relation to economic 
development. This paper examines such activity to make three arguments. First, 
exceptionalism took place, but was constrained by the nature of administrative devolution. 
Second, it often reflected the individual political philosophies of Secretaries of State and their 
ambitions on the UK’s political stage, as opposed to any desire for autonomy. Third, it was a 
crucial if inadvertent factor behind convincing the electorate that political devolution was 
both feasible and desirable. Overall, exceptionalism was driven by the Secretary of State’s 
ability to marshal the public sector behind his policy objectives, the momentum of existing 


















The Welsh Office was created in 1964 as an administratively devolved department 
with responsibilities over some aspects of government activity in Wales. Headed by a cabinet 
level Secretary of State for Wales, its initial responsibilities were modest but gradually 
expanded throughout the later 1960s and the 1970s. Labour secured the largest number of 
parliamentary seats in Wales throughout this period, forming the government at Westminster 
apart from between 1970 and 1974. However, the victory of the Conservative Party in the 
1979 and subsequent elections meant that their ministers controlled the Welsh Office until 
1997, although the party never held a majority of parliamentary seats in Wales. As a result, 
five Conservative Secretaries of State held office between 1979 and 1997. They were: 
Nicholas Edwards (1979 to 1987); Peter Walker (1987 to 1989); David Hunt (1989 to 1993);1 
John Redwood (1993 to 1995) and William Hague (1995 to 1997). 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, politicians and commentators often argued that 
Secretaries of State practiced ‘Welsh exceptionalism’, an approach proposed as having two 
components. First, ministers used their relative autonomy to create policies differing from 
those of central government. For example, historian K.O. Morgan stated in 1990 that the 
Secretary of State had ‘almost a free hand in spending, acting as Prime Minister and Cabinet 
rolled up into one’, implementing policies that were ‘un—Thatcherite’,2 while Nicholas 
Edwards later stated that Margaret Thatcher ‘didn’t entirely approve of some of the 
instruments that I used’.3 Second, exceptionalist policies appeared to have a more corporatist 
focus, with The Times claiming that Peter Walker had turned Wales into a 'giant laboratory to 
test his interventionist theories of government’ while ‘his boast that the spirit of Keynes once 
more walks the valleys […] infuriated the Prime Minister’.4 Despite such perceptions, later 
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analysis tended to downplay the extent of exceptionalism, with a 1999 study claiming that 
central government was able to ‘impose its preferred policies in Wales, whatever appearances 
to the contrary’,5 while Martin Johnes’ authoritative Wales since 1939 argued that the key 
difference over economic development was that the Welsh Office 'boasted about intervention 
rather than hid it’.6 However, the extent to which exceptionalism took place within economic 
development has yet to be fully analysed, as is also the case for the linkages between Welsh 
Office behaviour and the transformation between 1979 and 1997 of electoral attitudes 
towards political devolution.  
 
This article focuses on exceptionalism within economic development, drawing on 
archival material as well as interviews with politicians and those formerly holding senior 
positions within governmental organisations. Economic issues had a consistently high profile 
throughout the period, with all Secretaries of State seeing the economy as their leading 
personal policy objective.7 This was caused by the extent to which the Welsh economy, 
heavily dependent on steel, coal and manufacturing, was affected by the industrial downturn 
of the early 1980s. Between 1979 and 1983, the number of manufacturing employees 
dropped by 36 per cent while total employee levels throughout Wales fell by almost 14 per 
cent.8 The iconic state—run coal and steel industries lost over 70,000 jobs between 1979 and 
1985, with British Steel's Chief Executive noting in 1980 that the scale and speed of jobs 
losses in south Wales was of a 'magnitude never encountered before in a relatively small 
geographical area’.9 Some recovery was in place by the late 1980s, much of which was 
driven by Welsh Office intervention in areas such the attraction of overseas owned 
manufacturing plants. However, further deindustrialisation spurred the re—emergence of 
relative economic decline by 1997, by which time the employed and self—employed 
workforce was smaller than that of 1979. In political terms, the years up to 1997 witnessed 
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the virtual, if temporary, disappearance of the elected Conservative Party in Wales. Its 1983 
parliamentary total of 14 seats out of a possible 38 was reduced to six by the 1992 general 
election, it achieved a paltry 14.6 per cent of votes in the 1994 European election and lost all 
of its parliamentary seats in 1997. 
 
This paper makes three arguments. First, exceptionalism within economic 
development took place, with its most important element being the way in which Secretaries 
of State could use their position of authority to lead and direct public sector activity. Despite 
this, it was often exaggerated for political effect and was tightly constrained by the mechanics 
of administrative devolution. Second, it reflected the broader political ambitions and 
philosophies of Secretaries of State and the administrative momentum of the Welsh Office, as 
opposed to any desire for autonomous policymaking. Third, exceptionalism's greatest impact 
was in broad political terms as it was a crucial, if inadvertent, factor behind convincing the 
electorate that political devolution was both feasible and desirable. Overall, Welsh 
exceptionalism was driven by the Secretary of State’s ability to marshal the public sector 
behind his policy objectives, the momentum of existing institutions and the characteristics of 
each minister. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the Welsh 
Office before 1979, with the subsequent part detailing how its economic responsibilities 
evolved between 1979 and 1997. The following sections outline Welsh Office activity within 
economic development, analyse the extent to which this was exceptional and discuss the 
characteristics of each Secretary of State in relation to economic development. The final parts 




THE WELSH OFFICE BEFORE 1979 
 
Wales barely existed as an administrative unit in the immediate post—war years. 
Attempts to persuade central government to establish a Welsh equivalent of the 
administratively devolved Scottish Office were rebuffed in 1946 on the grounds that any such 
department would be too small to be efficient.10 In 1951, a Minister for Welsh Affairs was 
created but the post had very limited responsibilities and was subsumed into the office of 
Home Secretary. By the 1950s, some impetus towards administrative devolution was coming 
from the Labour Party and in 1964, the newly formed Labour Government created the cabinet 
level post of Secretary of State for Wales, with authority over what became known as the 
Welsh Office. Its birth was difficult with some MPs and officials pressing for the department 
to be established with a vague oversight role, without staff or executive responsibility.11 
However, after the first Secretary of State, Llanelli MP James Griffiths, threatened 
resignation, the Welsh Office was granted control over housing, local government, roads, 
economic planning and some other minor areas. While the Secretary of State and one or more 
junior ministers controlled policy over these areas, the Welsh Office’s priority for much of 
the 1960s and beyond was simply to secure its status, with its most important achievement 
being survival. Attempts to influence policy in non—devolved areas generally ended in 
failure, as happened in 1969 when the Welsh Office unsuccessfully asked the chair of the 
state—owned National Coal Board (NCB) to withdraw its decision to close a mine in 
Glyncorrwg, south Wales.12 
 
The Conservative—run Welsh Office between 1970 and 1974 was generally content 
to maintain the status quo, but the return of Labour to power in 1974 saw a far greater 
commitment to administrative and political devolution. Shortly after his appointment as 
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Secretary of State, John Morris told his civil servants that the Welsh Office should not be ‘a 
post office for other departments’ while there were ‘many ways in which the umbilical cord 
needs to be severed'.13 For example, he took advantage of the Scottish Office’s plans to create 
an economic development agency to obtain parliamentary approval for similar bodies in 
Wales.14 This enabled the creation of agencies that were later to be centrepieces of ‘Welsh 
exceptionalism’: the Welsh Development Agency, the Development Board for Rural Wales 
and the Land Authority for Wales. While similar bodies existed in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, none existed in the English regions with economic development generally remaining 
the responsibility of Whitehall. While some activities of the type carried out by the 
administratively devolved agencies did exist, budgets were often constrained and co—
ordination within English regions was largely absent given the degree of centralisation.  
 
By 1979, the Welsh Office’s staff total had doubled since 1974, while areas under its 
partial or sole responsibility had expanded to include 44 per cent of identifiable government 
expenditure in Wales, with the balance accruing to non—devolved areas such as nationalised 
industries and welfare.15 In terms of political devolution, government proposals to create an 
elected assembly were comprehensively rejected in 1979. Economic issues did not play a 
prominent role in the debate leading up to the referendum. Despite this, economic uncertainty 
combined with the dependence of the vitally important coal and steel industries on financial 
support from central government to create a climate that acted against constitutional 
experimentation. The Secretary of State later recalled that ‘the industrial problems in the 
winter of discontent were against us’, meaning that ‘in the end, we came to the stickiest end 





CHANGING RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE WELSH OFFICE, 1979 to 1997 
 
Writing in 1994, Rhodri Morgan, then the Labour MP for Cardiff West and a later 
First Minister of the politically devolved Welsh Government, pithily noted that senior civil 
servants at Westminster, often known as mandarins, sometimes referred to their counterparts 
in Cardiff as 'satsumas'.17 While apocryphal, this neatly symbolises how much of the Welsh 
Office’s history was characterised by its gradual emergence from under the shadow of 
Whitehall. Disentanglement was a long and complex process across economic issues, with 
responsibilities divided into three overlapping types throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
First, the Welsh Office had no responsibilities over fiscal and monetary policies or the 
nationalised coal and steel industries. Within coal, the political and financial issues were so 
difficult that the Welsh Office was reluctant to seek any involvement. For example, Derek 
Ezra, the NCB Chairman, secretly proposed in 1980 that the south Wales Coalfield be placed 
under the control of the Welsh Office 'to solve the area's problems in a Welsh context'.18 
However, this idea was rejected by the Welsh Office,19 probably as the crucial decisions over 
subsidy would have been retained by London. This meant that the Secretary of State could 
have been in the uncomfortable position of having accountability without full authority. 
Within steel, attempts to exercise informal influence by persuading central government to 
adopt a more interventionist approach during the turmoil of the early 1980s were ignored.20 
Second, the Welsh Office shared some responsibilities with Westminster over 
regional policies, created after the Second World War to reduce regional economic 
imbalances. The most prominent throughout the post—war ‘golden age’ of expansion was 
central government’s Industrial Development Certificates. These were necessary to construct 
factories throughout the UK and were used to divert industry to priority areas. While they had 
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played a crucial role in attracting industry to Wales, deindustrialisation reduced their 
effectiveness and the system was abolished in the early 1980s. An additional focus was grants 
to industries establishing operations in areas designated by the government as ‘assisted 
areas’, which covered much of Wales. While Westminster retained regulatory control, the 
Welsh Office administered Regional Development Grants, automatically given to 
manufacturing companies investing in assisted areas. It also controlled the process by which 
competitive Regional Selective Assistance grants were assessed and awarded. 
 
Third and most importantly in terms of exceptionalism, the Welsh Office had almost 
complete discretion over the economic development agencies it inherited from the previous 
administration; the Welsh Development Agency, the Development Board for Rural Wales 
and the Land Authority for Wales. These were joined from 1986 by the Cardiff Bay 
Development Corporation. In terms of scale, by far the largest was the Welsh Development 
Agency, which operated in the coastal and adjacent areas of north and south Wales. Its main 
activities were attracting overseas investment, constructing factories, investing in companies, 
reclaiming land made derelict by industry and providing business advisory services. The 
Development Board for Rural Wales operated in rural mid—Wales, with a similar remit to 
the Welsh Development Agency although without investment functions. The Land Authority 
for Wales was a much smaller organisation, whose responsibilities involved assembling 
packages of land for industrial and commercial use, while the Cardiff Bay Development 
Corporation developed the former Cardiff Docks. The Welsh Office set priorities for each 
agency and provided the bulk of their funding. Such support grew from some £59 million in 
1979—1980 to £131 million by 1996—1997, by which time almost £1.6 billion had been 
provided since 1979—1980. These agencies were established as arms—lengths bodies to 
ensure greater commercial flexibility than that offered by the civil service, although the 
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Welsh Office appointed their board members and chairs through a process that was opaque, 
secretive and controversial. The working of this system was symbolised by the appointment 
of Dr Gwyn Jones as Welsh Development Agency chair in 1988. He secured his post 
following a chance meeting with the Secretary of State at a Conservative Party fund raising 
event, causing a baffled Welsh Office Permanent Secretary, Richard Lloyd Jones, to make 
last minute phone calls asking ‘who is Dr Gwyn Jones?’ This was far from unique given the 
small and interlocking nature of the social and professional circles from which appointments 
were drawn. For example, a board member of the Wales Tourist Board (and Conservative 
Party member), Tony Lewis, told a House of Commons Select Committee in 1992 that his 
appointment did not follow a selection process. Instead, he received a telephone call asking 
him if he would join the board, after which he was simply sent a confirmation letter.21 By the 
1990s, economic development agencies were among the largest and most high profile 
Quangos (Quasi autonomous nongovernmental organisations) in Wales, with all such 
Quangos being collectively responsible for a third of all Welsh Office expenditure. 
 
Underlying all this was a complex system of territorial finance. By 1980, the Barnett 
Formula was in place.22 It was intended as a temporary measure to preserve per capita 
expenditure levels in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland that were higher than in England. 
It linked changes to budget allocations in England on activities that were devolved to Wales 
and elsewhere to the budgets controlled by territorial ministries for such activities. As well as 
this, their population size relative to England were also taken into account when HM 
Treasury calculated allocations. Central government’s funding to the Welsh Office was 
known as the 'Welsh Block' and from 1982, funds could be vired across most budget 
headings,23 often to the benefit of economic development agencies. Overall, the Welsh Office 
of the 1980s and 1990s did have significant responsibilities within economic development, 
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symbolised by control over Regional Selective Assistance and the agencies, but these were 
firmly embedded within a system that centralised responsibility for issues of broader 
economic significance.  
 
THE WELSH OFFICE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
While the Conservative Party in Wales had opposed the creation of economic 
development agencies throughout the 1970s, fearing that they might be used as agents of state 
centralism, this position was quickly reversed after 1979. Shortly after the election, Nicholas 
Edwards outlined the new approach when briefing the Prime Minister, stating that there was a 
‘continuing need’ for economic development agencies ‘to be allowed to pursue distinctive 
policies’ as ‘they can respond to local circumstances’.24 Against this background, expenditure 
and focus on economic development was maintained and can be categorised and assessed for 
exceptionalism across six areas: first, the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment; second, 
factory construction; third, urban regeneration; fourth, financial support to business; fifth, the 
provision of advisory services to businesses; and sixth, reclamation of land made derelict by 
industry. 
 
The most prominent and exceptional activity was foreign direct investment. By the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s, Wales was capturing up to a fifth of all overseas investment 
throughout the UK, recording the second highest share of any region between 1987—1988 
and 1991—1992.25 Success during these years was far in excess of Wales' population share of 
some 5 per cent and included the opening of large factories by globally recognisable names 
such as Toyota, Bosch and Panasonic. By the end of the 1980s, this was leading to heady talk 
of a ‘general sense of revival',26 although the Welsh Office and its agencies were often the 
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most vocal in promoting this view while foreign direct investment only ever accounted for a 
small proportion of total employment. Success was caused by the ability of the Welsh Office 
and its agencies to promote a 'package' to potential investors, with its contents summarised by 
Nicholas Edward’s industrial advisor as ‘we can give you premises, we can give you grants, 
we can give you a good labour force, we can give you a cheap labour force’.27 While 
elements of the 'package' such as cheap labour were largely caused by deindustrialisation, the 
role of the Welsh Office in enhancing the attractiveness of Wales as an investment location 
through factory construction, grants and loans was vital, as was the direct role of the 
Secretary of State. His role was symbolised by Peter Walker's successful intervention to 
attract a 900—job Bosch automotive components factory to a site near Cardiff. According to 
an officer at South Glamorgan County Council, the Secretary of State ‘sat in front of the 
Bosch entourage, who were looking to pull out of Wales, when he said, “I will deliver the 
planning. I will deliver the site within a timescale to meet your requirements,” when everyone 
else thought it wasn’t deliverable’.28 Following on from this, the council took a lease on the 
land, granted planning permission in an exceptionally short period of four weeks and then 
sold it to Bosch, an approach which was unusual at the time and later made illegal to prevent 
potential conflicts of interest.29 
 
The Secretary of State led what became known as the ‘Team Wales’ approach, which 
involved co—operation between government, trades unions and employee organisations. 
Team Wales was not just a marketing ploy, with the determination of the Welsh Office to 
form relationships across the political divide being remembered by David Jenkins, General 
Secretary of the Wales Trades Union Congress in the 1980s. He recounted the surreal 
experience of waking up on the airplane returning him from an inward investment mission to 
Japan and South Korea, to find the Secretary of State ‘still asleep next to me’, after which the 
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flight ‘was soon to land and we were about to be re—immersed into the bitterness of the 1984 
miners’ strike’, causing him to wonder ‘for a moment whether I had done the right thing’.30 
This relationship was completely at odds with the prevailing political climate within the UK 
as a whole and implied that foreign investors were expected to work closely with trades 
unions. As a result, all but one of the 12 Japanese plants in Wales by 1987 had agreed sole 
collective bargaining rights with one union.31 Overall, the role of ‘Team Wales’ was 
highlighted by a grant and location advisor with one of the major accountancy practices as 'if 
you were a potential [investor], somebody from the WDA [Welsh Development Agency] 
'would grab you' and 'run you through the system, they’d take you round Wales, they’d show 
you the best places to go, and they’d bring in everyone to speak to you’ while overall, ‘it was 
a very smooth system. You’d come in one end, you went through the sausage machine and 
you came out the other end.32  
 
However, success did not last, with the percentage of UK projects attracted to Wales 
dropping from 14.8 per cent in 1993—94 to 9.1 per cent in 1996—97, caused by difficulties in 
attracting service sector investment as well as growing competition for manufacturing 
projects from Ireland and Eastern Europe. The symbolic death knell for Foreign Direct 
Investment came in the late 1990s, after the failure of the Korean LG investment in Newport, 
originally forecast to employ some 6,000 people. This was offered subsidies of some £247 
million by the Welsh Office in 1996,33 sufficient to beat off competition from other parts of 
the UK, some of whom complained furiously about the greater resources available to Wales. 
Despite high hopes, the investment was derailed by a domestic financial crisis and was never 
fully realised. However, the success of foreign direct investment during the 1980s and the 
early 1990s was a clear example of Welsh exceptionalism in practice, given that it depended 
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on both the existence of the Welsh Development Agency as well as the ability of the 
Secretary of State to marshal the public sector behind his objectives.  
 
Crucially, the Welsh Development Agency maintained its own system of international 
offices in markets such as Japan and the United States, as did its Scottish and Northern Irish 
equivalents. England as a whole was represented by central government’s Invest in Britain 
Bureau, established in 1977 within the Department for Trade and Industry. However, the 
scale of its geographical responsibilities meant that the bureau and its sponsoring department 
struggled to match the level of service being offered by the WDA. While inward investment 
had a high profile, with Peter Walker claiming that Mrs Thatcher intervened to steer a Toyota 
project away from Wales towards Derby,34 this was unusual and only tended to happen with a 
small number of the highest profile projects. For example, Nicolas Edwards stated later that 
such direct intervention ‘certainly never happened in my time’.35 Overall, the autonomy of 
the Welsh Development Agency was safeguarded by the Secretary of State, with its success 
leading to resentment in the English regions, a factor which contributed towards the 
establishment of regional development agencies after 1997. 
 
 The second prominent and exceptional area of activity was the Welsh Development 
Agency and the Development Board for Rural Wales’ development of industrial sites and 
factories. This had emerged as a key activity in the later 1970s and was enthusiastically 
continued after 1979, with the Welsh Development Agency announcing the construction of 
356 factories between December 1979 and March 1980, comprising some 222,000 sq. meters 
of space. The scale and speed of these programmes was recognised as unparalleled, with the 
Secretary of State for Industry, Keith Joseph, noting in 1980 that the funding for factory 
construction in the area affected by the partial closure of the Shotton steel plant in North East 
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Wales could not be matched elsewhere in the UK.36 Overall, the Welsh Development Agency 
built almost a million sq. meters of factory space between 1979—1980 and 1989—1990, 
while the Development Board for Rural Wales doubled its portfolio in the same period. As 
part of the general focus on land development, the Land Authority for Wales was active in 
assembling packages of land for commercial and industrial uses, which it was able to do with 
the support of its compulsory purchase powers, although these were rarely used.37 The 
construction of factories was not unique to Wales, but the autonomy of the Welsh Office 
enabled far greater activity and impact to occur. For example, central government’s grant to 
its English Industrial Estates Corporation was £37.4 million in 1980-81, far less than the 
Welsh Office’s grant of £65.1 million to the Welsh Development Agency in the same year, 
most of which was spent on industrial property.38 
 
However, ongoing deindustrialisation and the rise of the service sector meant that the 
rationale for large scale programmes of factory building was no longer in place by the early 
1990s. At the same time, the arrival of John Redwood as Secretary of State in 1993 signalled 
change, with the Welsh Development Agency’s Chief Economist, Brian Morgan, stating later 
that the agency was told: ‘you’re interfering with the property market, you’re undermining a 
vibrant private sector property market by all your interventions’, so ‘I want you to sell the 
lot.’39 A large-scale disposal programme followed, with the agency’s tangible assets reducing 
from some £274 million to £89 million between 1993—1994 and 1997—1998.40 Overall, 
exceptionalism within factory construction was at its height in the early 1980s but by the 
mid—1990s, new attitudes within the Welsh Office combined with economic change to 




  While foreign direct investment and property development had strong elements of 
exceptionalism, the picture was more mixed in relation to the third and fourth areas; urban 
regeneration and the provision of financial support to companies. The flagship for urban 
regeneration emerged in south Cardiff, comprising the large area once taken up by the export 
of coal, while the Welsh Office played a crucial role in enabling regeneration with developers 
benefiting from the way that the proximity of Welsh Office ministers and officials made 
liaising with them far easier than was the case in England.41 For example, the Secretary of 
State intervened in the early 1980s when it appeared that progress on a development scheme 
was being impeded by disputes between the Labour run South Glamorgan Council and the 
Conservative run Cardiff City Council. He used his financial influence over local government 
to secure co—operation, with South Glamorgan’s chief planning officer recalling a 
‘Conservative Secretary of State telling a Conservative councillor, “Don’t be so stupid, work 
with the county, don’t fight them.”42  
 
Momentum increased in 1986, with the Welsh Office’s establishment of the Cardiff 
Bay Development Corporation, a Welsh equivalent of the Urban Development Corporations 
being founded in England to tackle inner city problems. However, the creation of Cardiff Bay 
Development Corporation highlighted the importance of the Secretary of State’s role. After 
HM Treasury expressed doubts as to whether the project should proceed, Edwards wrote a 
private note to Margaret Thatcher threatening resignation, phrased as he would ‘find himself 
in a position of very great difficulty if agreement was not forthcoming’, after which funding 
was approved.43 As well as this, local authorities were heavily involved in the development of 
plans for the area, had board representatives and kept planning powers over housing, 
transport and commercial developments.44 This was different from elsewhere, where Urban 
Development Corporations with such powers were generally imposed on often unwilling 
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local authorities. Cardiff Bay’s centrepiece was a £210 million barrage, designed to improve 
the area’s physical appearance and investment prospects by creating a freshwater reservoir in 
place of tidal mudflats. Although local authorities were broadly supportive, there was large—
scale public opposition. As a result, the barrage became the subject of seven separate bills 
and over a thousand hours of parliamentary debate, with construction not commencing until 
1993.45 Despite this, political support remained constant, with the Cardiff Bay Development 
Corporation Chairman recalling that he never had a ‘disagreement or a disappointment’ with 
Peter Walker,46 while David Hunt stated in 1990 that he was ‘wholly convinced that the 
project is central to the maximising of a remarkable opportunity’.47 However, delays meant 
that the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation was behind schedule by 1997, although given 
the £360 million that had been allocated to the organisation by the Welsh Office since 1986—
1987, a formidable momentum was in place that would produce results well after 1997, 
completely transforming the area’s appearance and prospects.  
 
While Cardiff Bay benefited from the Welsh Office’s determination to use its powers 
and status to the fullest extent, there was little that was exceptional about other initiatives. 
These included the Urban Development Programme, launched in 1983 to fund public—
private schemes to restore townscapes. However, central government also emphasised such 
schemes, with more than 200 urban improvement areas being in place throughout England by 
the mid—1980s.48 Other initiatives also mirrored activities in England. Most notable was 
1992's Ebbw Vale garden festival, with the Welsh Office choosing its location on a site 
formerly occupied by part of a steelworks. Despite this, the festival was a Welsh equivalent 
of one of a series throughout England under the leadership of Michael Heseltine, the 
interventionist Secretary of State for the Environment. Wales' three enterprise zones in 
Swansea, Milford Haven and Delyn also mirrored their English counterparts in their usage of 
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planning and tax—related concessions to attract investment, often with disappointing results. 
Finally, the Valleys Initiative, launched with great fanfare in 1989 as an £800 million 
development plan was little more than a compendium of existing schemes and initiatives 
collectively given a new identity for marketing purposes, some of which were even 
proceeding without Welsh Office support. For example, it was claimed in February 1989 that 
a business and retail park development in Caerphilly, expected to create up to 2,000 jobs, was 
proceeding thanks to the programme, before it emerged that the company behind the project 
had neither applied for, nor received, any government support.49 
 
When providing financial support to companies, the Welsh Office simply acted as 
regional administrator for Regional Development Grant until its abolition by central 
government in 1988, by which time some £900 million had been awarded since 1979—1980. 
However, control over Regional Selective Assistance enabled a Welsh Office appointed 
board to choose which companies received the £990 million awarded between 1979—1980 
and 1996—1997. Such grants were an important part of the 'Team Wales' approach to 
attracting investment with, for example, applications from 209 companies being approved in 
1984—1985, expected to create some 10,000 new jobs.50 Despite this, Welsh Office 
discretion over the scheme had limitations, with central government periodically redrawing 
the map of assisted areas throughout the UK. The 1993 revision switched resources towards 
parts of England, reducing the percentage of the working population of Wales living in 
assisted areas from 35 to 15 per cent. As well as this, the Barnett formula led to a steady 
reduction in the amount of regional aid awarded in Wales, dropping by almost a third in real 
terms between 1982—1983 and 1986—1987. However, the 1994 inclusion of Regional 
Selective Assistance in the Welsh Block granted the Welsh Office the powers to increase or 
decrease the level of funding.51 This immediately highlighted the influence of the Secretaries 
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of State, with John Redwood more than halving the allocation before it was restored by 
William Hague.  
 
In contrast to grants, the Welsh Office had total discretion over loans to companies, 
with activity being far more interventionist than was generally the case in England. Loans 
were provided to businesses throughout Wales by the Welsh Development Agency, which 
invested some £24 million in 300 companies between 1981—1982 and 1984—1985, a type 
and volume of assistance not available in the English regions.52 While the agency was keen to 
make further investments, identifying viable opportunities in a depressed economy proved 
difficult, and the agency failed to record a positive cumulative return on its investment 
portfolio after 1982—1983. While this could have been problematic given the prevailing 
political orthodoxy within central government, Wales was different. Throughout the 1980s, 
the focus was on economic expansion and confidence building, with David Waterstone, 
Welsh Development Agency Chief Executive between 1983 and 1990, later stating that the 
agency was prepared to absorb losses as part of a drive to increase ‘levels of commercial 
spirit’.53 However, this desire began to dissipate at the end of the decade as the economy 
appeared to recover. By 1989—1990, the agency had accepted that it was ‘difficult, if not 
impossible’ to invest in start-up or early stage businesses, and ‘make a positive return’.54 This 
led to a full withdrawal from this area of activity in 1994—1995 and the end of any 
exceptionalism. 
 
Finally, there was little that was exceptional about the fifth and sixth areas of activity; 
business support and land reclamation, although these areas were consistently prioritised by 
the Welsh Office. In relation to business support, the scale of activity was such that the Welsh 
Development Agency’s Small Firms Centre responded to enquiries from 17,000 individuals 
19 
 
or companies in 1985—1986,55 while the Development Board for Rural Wales’ seven 
business centres handled some 5,000 enquiries per annum by the 1990s.56 In 1996, the Welsh 
Office established the Business Connect service to provide a more centralised business advice 
service, although the Welsh Development Agency provided additional services across 
sourcing and supplier development, technology support and skills.57 However, there was little 
to differentiate services in Wales from those elsewhere with the creation of Business Connect 
lagging behind that of England while it was largely based on the Scottish equivalent.58 In 
relation to the reclamation of land left derelict by industry, such activity had been a Welsh 
Office priority since the Aberfan disaster of 1966 and was enthusiastically continued after 
1979. Between 1979–1980 and 1989—1990, some 3,300 hectares (32 sq. kilometres) were 
reclaimed.59 In 1990, the Welsh Office announced that it aimed to have reclaimed all derelict 
land in Wales by 2000, defined as an area 'equivalent in size to the combined built up areas of 
Cardiff, Newport and Swansea’.60 In mid—1994, the National Audit Office issued the 
findings of its investigation into the agency’s reclamation programme, noting that it was good 
value for money and ‘widely recognised as a notable achievement’.61 Although Secretaries of 
State were keen to see rapid progress and prioritised reclamation projects, many of which 
produced dramatic results, reclamation of derelict land tended to be a priority where it 
occurred and was not confined to Wales. 
 
While the Welsh Office presided over intervention of a volume and type that would 
not all have occurred in the absence of administrative devolution, exceptionalism was limited 
in terms of policy instruments, virtually all of which were similar to those used in England, as 
was the case for other areas such as housing and education.62 However, while the instruments 
may often have been similar, circumstances combined to create some exceptionalism within 
intervention such as foreign direct investment, factory construction and Cardiff Bay. These 
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included the ability of the Welsh Office and its agencies to set their own priorities and 
budgets, as well as the Secretary of State's willingness to use his broader powers to co—
ordinate and direct public sector activity. At the same time, regionalism and the development 
of strategies and approaches to sub—national economic problems in England fell out of 
favour after 1979, in part due to central government’s hostility to economic planning and its 
promotion of market orientated solutions.63 As a result, regional structures in England did not 
exist until 1995, when government offices for the regions were established with some powers 
over regeneration. Importantly, while the creation of regional development agencies in 
England (modelled on the Welsh example) was often mooted, this did not happen before 
1997. Overall, while exceptionalism did exist within elements of economic development, it 
arguably had more significance within presentational politics, as reflected by the political 
personalities of the Secretaries of State. 
 
SECRETARIES OF STATE 
 
Nicholas Edwards, the first Conservative after 1979, was the first and only Secretary 
of State to sit for a Welsh constituency (Pembrokeshire). While he was wholly loyal to 
Margaret Thatcher, his views were generally pragmatic, announcing to the House of 
Commons in 1980 that he had ‘never been a great observer and follower of any specific, 
extreme economic theory’,64 while Rhodri Morgan later said that 'you wouldn't have said he 
was one nation, but you wouldn’t have called him an out and out Thatcherite’.65 Such 
differences were to play a pivotal role in economic development. In 1980, the Financial 
Times went as far as to call Nicholas Edwards ‘an arch exponent of regional policy’.66 It was 
during his time in office that the architecture of exceptionalism began to take shape, with his 
eight years in post being by far the longest of any Conservative Secretary of State. While he 
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supported the broader Conservative thrusts of deregulation and privatization, he was willing 
to use the agencies inherited from the previous Labour administration to their fullest extent. 
He saw no contradiction between the two, stating that ‘all the paraphernalia of grants, 
agencies and advance factories are useless if the economic climate is such that the 
government makes profit impossible’.67 
 
Despite this, some tension was inevitable and can be illustrated by a speech given to 
the Cardiff Business Club in 1985. Described as ‘astonishingly bitter’ by the Financial 
Times,68 it began with an approving reference to Martin Wiener’s book, English Culture and 
the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850–1980. The book's thesis that the failures of British 
industry were symptoms of economic, political, social and cultural malaise fitted with 
Conservative thought in the 1980s, which was determined to sweep away what it saw as 
elitist and defeatist attitudes to wealth creation. Edwards castigated the City of London for 
what he saw as its negative views of Wales, where there were ‘no capable businessmen’ and 
that there was ‘nothing to be seen but decaying coal mines, run—down steelworks and 
slagheaps'. He went on to attack the ‘prejudice, ignorance, and striking lack of awareness’ 
displayed by those working in the City towards any area ‘outside their own experience’, 
before stating that ‘it is our central aim to use the machinery we have and the funds at our 
disposal to act as a lead and catalyst for the growing investment and participation of the 
private sector.’69 This speech acted as the defining text of exceptionalism, with Edward’s 
variant motivated by the impact of economic decline, as opposed to any desire for personal 
advancement on the UK’s political stage. It used powerful rhetoric, but in reality the ambition 
was limited, focusing on using existing machinery to intervene and enable self—sustaining 




The appointment of Peter Walker, MP for Worcester, as Secretary of State in 1987 
brought about an intensification of interventionist rhetoric, even if many of the measures 
were little changed from those promoted by Nicolas Edwards. He was a prominent ‘wet’ as 
well as a self—declared ‘One Nation’ Conservative.70 He welcomed intervention, stating that 
Margaret Thatcher had ‘failed to create the right relationship between government and 
industry’, instead adopting a ‘free trade attitude belonging to another century’.71 He was 
perceived as the one great survivor of Heathite Conservatism, while his continuation in 
government was assured as he was seen as being too politically dangerous to return to the 
backbenches. According to Peter Walker, ‘the big attraction of the Welsh Secretary’s job was 
that I was told by Margaret Thatcher that ‘I could do it my way'.72 One of his first acts was to 
tour the Valleys, before presenting ten regeneration ideas to his somewhat awed staff, ranging 
from a subsidised house painting scheme to developing a hotel and golf course on the bleak 
and windswept Rassau plateau above Ebbw Vale.73 However, rhetoric sometimes outpaced 
reality, as was the case with the Valleys Initiative. Overall, The Times correctly pointed out 
that Wales was an ‘ideal laboratory for the Walker—Heseltine ideal of industrial 
regeneration’, wryly noting that ‘Thatcherism bleakly wishes the whole place would decamp 
to a green—field site near Woking.’74 
 
When Peter Walker stood down in 1990, he was replaced with David Hunt, MP for 
Wirral and Secretary of State between 1990 and 1993. Describing himself as a ‘pragmatic 
progressive’, the politics of the Welsh Office were later highlighted when Michael Heseltine 
claimed that all three of its ministers voted against Margaret Thatcher in the 1990 leadership 
election.75 While David Hunt had a quieter political personality than his predecessor, both 
shared a similar political philosophy based on an acceptance that the state has a broad role to 
play in economic and social regeneration. The broad thrusts of intervention thus remained 
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unchanged, with the Welsh Office strongly supporting the attraction of inward investment, 
the reclamation of land made derelict by industry and the development of Cardiff Bay. 
Differences between the approach of the Welsh Office and central government were later 
highlighted by Ron Davies, Labour’s Shadow Secretary of State between 1992 and 1997:  
 
Peter Walker was Energy Minister during the time of the miners’ strike, before he 
became Secretary of State, and so we had lots of conversations with him, and we 
knew that he was deeply concerned about the consequences of what was happening in 
the miners’ strike […] So we knew where he was politically. The same with David 
Hunt, it was perhaps no more than a raised eyebrow or, you know, the off guard 
comment that he would make, but you knew that there was a real political gulf 
between what they wanted and their aspirations, and the dry Thatcherite agenda.76 
 
However, this consensus was challenged by John Redwood, MP for Wokingham and 
Secretary of State from 1993. He held right—wing views and had been Chief Policy Advisor 
to Margaret Thatcher. His appointment was roundly condemned by opposition parties and 
commentators who perceived him as an aloof ‘viceroy on the make’,77 whose ‘only link with 
Wales is the M4’, while footage of his unsuccessful attempt to sing the national anthem at a 
Welsh Conservative Conference passed into political folklore. In ideological terms, John 
Redwood had little time for existing interventionist policies which he felt had run their 
course; ‘the wounds created in Wales by the collapse of traditional industries are healing. 
Development agencies have been necessary bandages’ as ‘they assist recovery but the healing 
comes from within from the talents, energies and ideas of people and the businesses they set 
up or attract.'78 He also believed that the state’s economic role had been too great, and had 
turned Wales, in the words of his advisor Hywel Williams, into a ‘fantasy land of Keynes—
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by—Sea’.79 Instead of intervention, economic growth was facilitated by greater competition, 
privatisation, tax reductions and market flexibility.80 In practical terms, the approaches which 
had characterised exceptionalism were reversed. Grant to the Welsh Development Agency 
was heavily reduced and it was instructed to sell much of its land and property portfolio, the 
Development Board for Rural Wales was only saved from a merger with the Welsh 
Development Agency due to a lack of parliamentary time, Regional Selective Assistance 
budgets were reduced and the Welsh Office became temporarily unwilling to offer investors 
large grant packages to locate in Wales. While his impact was noticeable, his period in office 
was short, resigning in mid—1995 to challenge unsuccessfully for the Conservative 
leadership.  
 
John Redwood’s successor was William Hague, MP for Richmond in Yorkshire since 
1989. This was his first cabinet post and he soon demonstrated that his political and 
administrative instincts were a good deal less radical than his predecessor, restating the role 
of the Welsh Office within economic development. The cuts in grants to the Welsh 
Development Agency were reversed, while he was instrumental in assembling a large-scale 
package of grant support to the ill—fated LG investment in Newport, which had promised to 
create thousands of jobs but failed to create more than a fraction. Despite this, key 
Conservative themes of deregulation and enterprise were heavily emphasised with, for 
example, his 1996 White Paper on rural development aiming to ‘lift the burden of red tape on 
farmers and rural businesses’, to ‘recreate that vital spirit of enterprise that makes rural life 
possible'.81 However, he spent less than two years in office, with his role ending when the 





DRIVERS OF EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
The study of territorial politics in the 1980s and 1990s has centred on centre-
periphery relations, with theoretical debate focusing on issues including the extent to which 
these were driven by differing values within elites and the specificity of economic, cultural 
and political factors.82 Differences of values between politicians within core (central 
government) and periphery (the Welsh Office) institutions did exist but only as different 
strands of Conservative thought, although the Welsh Office’s administrative culture was 
more interventionist than that within Whitehall. In interpreting Welsh exceptionalism within 
the parameters of this debate, three drivers can be identified, comprising: first, the ability of 
the Secretary of State to marshal the public sector behind his policy objectives; second, the 
institutional dynamic caused by the momentum of existing institutions; and finally, the 
political views and ambitions of each Minister. First, the Secretary of State for Wales was a 
‘king’,83 with either full authority or some influence over much of the public sector in Wales. 
He could marshal the various public bodies such as the Welsh Office, development agencies 
and those in local government behind an integrated programme of economic development. 
This did not happen in the English regions, as there were no regional equivalents to the 
Welsh Office and its ministerial leadership. All Secretaries of State, with the exception of 
John Redwood, broadly followed the same approach in terms of using their position to co—
ordinate and promote intervention. While the clearest example was the drive to attract foreign 
direct investment, it was also apparent in other areas. Overall, the importance of the Secretary 
of State’s role was described by a Welsh Development Agency Director of Property as:  
 
We all used to sit together to talk about how intervention could be improved. And that 
was chaired by David Hunt. So these small, but vitally important issues, ultimately 
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depended on the prowess of the Secretary of State. So I can’t overemphasise just how 
important that role was.84 
 
Second, the existence of the Welsh Office and development agencies created an 
institutional dynamic where the existence and momentum of interventionist agencies made 
further intervention more likely. The culture of the Welsh Office throughout the 1970s was 
often recognised as being interventionist,85 reflecting the scale of state involvement in the 
post-war economy. At the same time, this dynamic was also shaped by the more traditionally 
left of centre politics in Wales, with this creating a climate where interventionism was seen as 
the correct reaction to economic change. Secretaries of State found themselves in an 
environment that led them towards greater intervention. This inevitably impacted on their 
behaviour, with a Welsh Development Agency Board member noting that they tended to 'go 
native’, wanting to ‘leave the place better than when I found it'.86 However, any desire to 
placate nationalism barely featured in this process for much of the period, given the scale of 
the referendum defeat in 1979. Nationalist and pro-devolutionary forces did not regain 
significant ground until the early 1990s, by which time the dynamics of exceptionalism were 
well established. 
 
At the same time, the lure of positive public relations was irresistible, with Lord 
Morris justifiably arguing that while Conservative Secretaries of State firmly rejected any 
hint of extending state control into the private sector, they supported the continuation of the 
agencies partly because of the political ‘glory’ associated with announcing investments such 
as large factories.87 As a result, most Secretaries of State allowed economic development 
organisations to continue along lines similar to those established in the 1970s, and were 
enthusiastic about promoting a Welsh equivalent to the urban development corporations 
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established in England. The only exception to this consensus was John Redwood. His policy 
advisor later admitted that the Welsh Office under his leadership resisted the ‘sordid 
scramble’ of bidding against other regions for investment projects,88 while Redwood also 
claimed that he had been able to return part of the Welsh Office’s budget allocation to HM 
Treasury as it was not needed. However, the difficulties of pursing policies not in keeping 
with established institutional norms were highlighted by Ron Davies who recalled a 
conversation with a ‘senior civil servant when I was Secretary of State' who said that John 
Redwood 'was very happy to think that he’d done it [sent money back] but we wouldn’t have 
done that, we wouldn’t have sent the money back, would we?’89  
 
Finally, the individual political philosophies and ambitions of the Secretaries of State 
was inevitably reflected in the way in which economic development was prioritised. In terms 
of political philosophies, all bar John Redwood were either One Nation (Peter Walker and 
David Hunt) or pragmatists (Nicholas Edwards and William Hague). While the One Nation 
Secretaries of State had a more enthusiastic approach to trumpeting the desirability of state 
intervention than the pragmatists, all were united by their desire to use the Welsh Office and 
its agencies to play a prominent role in economic development and acted accordingly. In 
terms of political ambitions, Nicholas Edwards was content to retire both from the cabinet 
and the House of Commons in 1987. Although both David Hunt and William Hague had 
further ambitions, with the former moving to the more senior position of Secretary of State 
for Employment in 1993 and the latter assuming the leadership of the Conservative Party in 
1997, they did not seek to use their post to advertise their ambitions beyond establishing a 




However, Peter Walker and John Redwood were very different. Both had broader 
ambitions, and used their post as Secretary of State to advertise this, albeit in very different 
ways. Peter Walker’s impact was accentuated by his role on the UK’s political stage, where 
he was viewed as a potential challenger to Margaret Thatcher. He realised that the freedom of 
manoeuvre accorded to the Secretary of State gave him an ideal opportunity to use Wales as a 
test bed for his style of interventionist politics, and thus mount an implicit challenge to 
prevailing Conservative policy. It was commonly assumed that he accepted the position on 
the basis that he would be left alone in return for an understanding that he would not 
challenge Margaret Thatcher. According to Dafydd Wigley, the president of Plaid Cymru 
throughout the early 1980s and the 1990s, exceptionalism ‘was self—serving, but that didn’t 
necessarily mean that it wasn’t happening’ as Peter Walker was taking ‘great joy from doing 
things differently wherever he could’.90 While Peter Walker promoted a vision of 
Conservatism to the left of the then Prime Minister, John Redwood did the opposite. He used 
his cabinet position and the ability of the Secretary of State to speak on a wide range of issues 
given the breadth of his responsibilities to promote a strongly Thatcherite ‘small state’ view 
that could promote his leadership ambitions. His views presented a clear alternative to Prime 
Minister John Major’s relatively centrist approach, with his advisor, Hwyel Williams, 
claiming that the Secretary of State was ‘emboldened to see in Wales fertile ground for a 
distinctive set of policies that would be an implicit commentary on the wider fortunes of 
Conservatism'.91  
 
Finally, there is the question of why Secretaries of State were allowed a relatively free 
hand. In general, this was due to the relatively limited powers of the Welsh Office, a lack of 
interest in what was a small part of the UK and a sense that the post could be used safely as a 
place of internal exile for political opponents. Margaret Thatcher's personal lack of interest in 
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Wales was also apparent. In the words of Nicholas Edwards, it was 'alien territory, far from 
the England that she knew and understood'.92 At the same time, this lack of interest was also 
pragmatic, given the way in which the relatively limited powers of the Secretary of State 
reduced his ability to cause her any significant difficulties. While the lack of interest 
continued after 1987, the dynamic was somewhat different with Peter Walker. He owed his 
position, and the relative freedoms associated with the post, to the Prime Minister’s desire to 
forestall any further political mischief. John Major’s appointments of David Hunt and 
William Hague mirrored Margaret Thatcher’s appointment of Nicholas Edwards, with both 
being seen as reliable and broadly supportive in political terms. Lastly, the use of the Welsh 
Office as a place in which to place troublesome opponents emerged again in the mid—1990s, 
with John Redwood’s eventful time in office.  
 
THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
While all Secretaries of State saw the economy as their major policy focus and were 
firmly opposed to political devolution, the drive for an elected National Assembly to take 
control over the Welsh Office gradually reappeared within political discourse in the late 
1980s and beyond. The case for such a body rested on ensuring greater democratic 
accountability as well as enabling the development and implementation of policies more 
attuned to Wales. While the popularity of the newly formed Labour Government was a 
crucial factor in securing a narrow yes vote in the 1997 referendum, exceptionalism was also 
used to justify both parts of the devolutionary case. By the late 1980s, the declining electoral 
fortunes of the Conservative Party meant that it was increasingly short of personnel with 
some democratic credibility that could be nominated for board positions on the Welsh 
Office’s agencies. This led to a patronage system that was widely seen as undemocratic, as 
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the people being put forward tended to have strong links to the Conservative Party. 
Meanwhile, the legitimacy of a system where appointments were in the hands of a party with 
a shrinking share of the vote was increasingly questioned. This was an important element of a 
broader disenchantment with Conservative control over the Welsh Office, symbolised for 
Ron Davies by a piece of graffiti in the traditionally Labour voting south Wales Valleys that 
appeared the day after the 1987 election reading: ‘we voted Labour, but got Thatcher.’93 
 
At the same time, the rhetoric around exceptionalism propelled the economic 
development quangos to a status as flagship organisations. This high profile meant that they 
were now highlighted as symbols of a democratic deficit, seen as being too close to the 
Conservatives and became political targets. This was accentuated for the Welsh Development 
Agency by the buccaneering style of its Chairman, Gwyn Jones, praised as a ‘marvellous 
chap’ by Margaret Thatcher in 1989 during a visit to the Rhondda. Throughout the 1990s, the 
Welsh Development Agency and the Development Board for Rural Wales were enmeshed in 
governance scandals as while their operational performance was strong, breaches of 
management protocols were magnified in a hostile political climate. Both were subject to 
bruising inquiries carried out by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. 
Its 1993 report on the Welsh Development Agency in relation to issues such as expenses, 
appointments and pension arrangements was particularly scathing, describing events as ‘a 
catalogue of serious and inexcusable breaches of expected standards of control and 
accountability’.94 The way in which exceptionalism had led the economic development 
quangos into assuming a high profile now worked against them, as they became symbols of 
what was characterised by the government’s political opponents as an unaccountable, 




Ironically, while the anti—devolutionist Secretaries of State often promoted 
exceptionalism to further their own careers, those in favour of political devolution used this 
rhetoric to promote their cause. They argued that the existence of a semi—autonomous policy 
capability demonstrated that political devolution had a solid and proven administrative base 
on which to build further interventions. At the same time, economic change also supported 
the devolutionist cause. In 1979, the industrial economy of Wales was largely comprised of 
either the state—owned coal and steel industries, or privately owned factories that had been 
attracted to Wales by governments’ regional policy. However, the loss of much of this 
economic base during the 1980s removed the fear apparent in the previous decade that any 
loosening of central political control posed a risk to the economy. In the words of Ron 
Davies, the Labour politician who did most to deliver devolution, the 1980s and 1990s saw a: 
 
Strengthening of the idea that we in Wales had to take more and more responsibility 
for ourselves. That we couldn’t just rely on the command economists of London to 
provide jobs in terms of coal and steel and transport and so on, the big nationalised 
industries in the public sector.95 
 
The extent to which the desire to rejuvenate the economy fed into the drive for 
political devolution within the administrative elite was reflected in the decision of a former 
Welsh Development Agency Chief Executive, David Waterstone, to join the ‘Yes for Wales’ 
steering committee established to lead the ‘yes’ campaign during the referendum campaign.96 
As a result of these dynamics, interaction between accountability and economic development 
was a central focus of the post—1997 Labour Government’s White Paper setting out its 
proposals for devolution. It stated that ‘unelected bodies (quangos) like the WDA [Welsh 
Development Agency]’ constituted a ‘democratic deficit’ that would be addressed by the 
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establishment of an elected body, while ‘one of the Assembly’s most important tasks will be 
to provide clear leadership and strategic direction to boost the Welsh economy’.97 Overall, 
the high profile of economic development agencies was used as a vehicle with which to 
expose the partly undemocratic nature of the political settlement. At the same time, an 
interventionist structure had been created that was seen to be working, thus providing the 




While exceptionalism existed, its practical impact on economic development should 
not be overstated. Its focus was on the extent to which the Secretaries of State were able to 
use their position and autonomy to marshal interventions, as opposed to the creation and 
implementation of policies at odds with central government. This was accompanied by a 
willingness to work closely with local government and trade unions that was not matched by 
central government, most notably in relation to the attraction of foreign direct investment. 
The exception to this consensus was of course John Redwood, but even his rapid reversal of 
interventions acted to highlight the degree to which the Secretary of State had autonomy over 
devolved areas. At the same time, the rhetoric of exceptionalism acted to obscure the lack of 
significant differences between even the most interventionist Secretaries of State and central 
government on the great economic issues of the time. Moreover, the long roll—call of 
factories constructed, investment attracted and businesses advised hides the fact that the 
Welsh Office’s economic powers were in reality limited.  
 
At the same time, exceptionalism was generally motivated by the existence of an 
interventionist structure as well as the individual political personalities and ambitions of the 
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Secretary of State, as opposed to any desire for greater autonomy. While Nicholas Edwards 
was determined to use the powers inherited from the previous government to offset economic 
crisis and had no further ambitions, other Secretaries of State used their position as a stepping 
stone to greater things. John Redwood challenged the leadership from the right, Peter Walker 
did the same but from the left while David Hunt and William Hague sought to build a 
reputation based on competence as opposed to ideological positioning. Finally, the most 
important impact of exceptionalism was not economic, but rather in the way it inadvertently 
and ironically acted to legitimise calls for greater devolution. This greatly assisted the long 
drive for political devolution that eventually culminated in the ‘yes’ vote in the 1997 
referendum and the subsequent creation of the National Assembly for Wales. 
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